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Warren W. Faulk, Esq.
Camden County Prosecutor‟s Office
25 North 5th Street
Camden, New Jersey 08102
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__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
This appeal by Marshall Rountree, from a judgment of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition, requires
us to decide if the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, was unreasonable in concluding that alleged
violations of Rountree‟s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
did not undermine the reliability of the sentence he received
for an armed robbery he committed in Camden County, New
Jersey. Applying provisions of the Antiterrorism and
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Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), we conclude that
the New Jersey appellate court‟s decision in this case was not
contrary to and did not unreasonably apply federal law, nor
was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We will therefore
affirm the District Court.
I.
A.
Within the span of two weeks in July of 1993 Marshall
Rountree, who also uses the name Mark Hawkins, perpetrated
two unrelated firearm incidents in New Jersey: an armed
robbery in Camden County, and a shooting in Essex County.
The Essex County shooting occurred on a street, after
Rountree and two companions encountered the boyfriend of
one of the men‟s sisters. The men exchanged words, then
blows. At some point, Rountree drew a revolver and shot the
boyfriend, rendering him paraplegic. The Camden County
robbery occurred two weeks later when Rountree covered his
face with a white towel, approached a woman from behind a
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dumpster in her apartment building‟s parking lot and said, “I
have a gun. Give me your purse or I‟ll shoot you.” She
surrendered the purse, and called the police after he fled the
scene. Minutes later, Rountree, carrying a white towel, was
spotted near a shopping mall. Officers arrested him and
recovered various items that had been inside the woman‟s
purse, but did not recover a pistol. Rountree waived his
Miranda rights and provided a taped confession in which he
claimed he robbed the woman with a toy pistol and then
discarded it into a nearby wooded area. Later, during plea
bargaining, he swore under oath that the pistol was real.
Both crimes were subject to New Jersey‟s “Graves
Act,” which sets forth mandatory penalties if a person “used
or was in possession of a firearm” during or in flight from a
violent offense. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:43-6(c), (d), (g),
(h), 2C:44-3(d). Of particular importance to this appeal is a
Graves Act repeat-offender provision, which substantially
enhances sentences if a person who possesses or uses a
firearm during a crime “has been previously convicted of an
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offense involving the use or possession of a firearm.”
§ 2C:43-6(c).
In 1993, a grand jury in Camden County indicted
Rountree for first-degree armed robbery and third-degree
hindering justice. The same year, he was also indicted in
Essex County for conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree
attempted murder, second-degree aggravated assault, thirddegree unlawful possession of a weapon, and second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Plea
negotiations occurred separately in each county. Soon after
they began, Rountree‟s Camden County attorney obtained
judicial and prosecutorial permission to consolidate the
Camden County and Essex County negotiations into one plea
bargaining session, pursuant to Rule 3:25A-1 of the New
Jersey Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part:
[W]hen a defendant has charges pending in
more than one county at any stage prior to
sentencing, either the defendant, or the
prosecutor in any such county with the consent
of the defendant, may move before the
presiding judge of the criminal part in the
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county in which consolidation is sought, or
before any judge designated to hear such
motion, for consolidation for purposes of
entering a plea or for sentencing.
Although there was every indication that a Rule 3:25A-1
motion would have been granted, Rountree‟s Camden County
attorney failed to file one and, as a result, the negotiations
continued separately.
As early as March of 1994, prosecutors offered
Rountree a choice regarding his Camden County charges: he
could plead guilty to non-Graves Act offenses in return for a
12-year sentence, or he could plead guilty to a Graves Act
offense in return for a 9-year sentence. If accepted, either
offer would have resolved Rountree‟s Camden County
charges, but not his Essex County Charges. Rountree‟s
attorney wrote him a letter explaining the enhancement effect
that a Graves Act conviction would have on any sentence that
might be imposed for the shooting in Essex County, and
recommended the 12-year non-Graves Act offer. Nonetheless,
Rountree chose the 9-year offer. Under the plea agreement,
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Rountree‟s sentence was to run concurrently with any
sentence imposed for the still-unresolved charges related to
the shooting he had committed in Essex County.
In the fall of 1994, after entering his plea in Camden
County but before the court accepted the plea and sentenced
him, Rountree was transferred to Essex County to address the
shooting-related charges there. Prosecutors and Rountree
were unable to reach a plea agreement, and the case went to
trial. In October of 1994, a jury convicted Rountree of firstdegree attempted murder, second-degree aggravated assault,
and two separate firearm crimes. He received a 20-year
Graves Act sentence. Soon after he was sentenced, however,
and under threat of appeal, prosecutors agreed that faulty jury
instructions required a new trial. Before retrial, and after
much negotiation, Rountree pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose—
both of which are Graves Act offenses. The Essex County
Court accepted Rountree‟s plea and sentenced him to two
concurrent 10-year prison terms, during the first half of which
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he would be ineligible for parole. At this time Rountree stood
convicted of his first Graves Act offense.
Rountree then returned to Camden County in July of
1995 to complete sentencing on his plea to the robberyrelated offenses still pending there. Somewhat unexpectedly,
the Camden County Court rejected the plea agreement. It
explained that the 9-year sentence Rountree had accepted
before his transfer to Essex County was either too lenient for
the crimes he had committed or, alternatively, was illegal.
The court reasoned thusly: even if Rountree had used a toy
pistol (as he initially claimed) the 9-year sentence the
government had offered was too lenient under New Jersey
law; alternatively, if the pistol was real, then the sentence was
illegal under the Graves Act (which requires extended prison
time for repeat firearm offenders) given Rountree‟s recent
Graves Act conviction in Essex County. Rountree responded
by withdrawing his guilty plea.
The Camden County case was set for trial in April of
1996, and plea negotiations continued. On the day of trial, the
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Camden County prosecutor offered Rountree a 20-year
sentence with a 7-year term of parole ineligibility, to run
concurrently with the 10-year sentence he had received in
Essex County (hereinafter, the “April 1996 offer”). Rountree
rejected it. He explained to the court that he was not
interested in the prosecutor‟s offer because he believed that
the time he had already served in Essex County was “dead
time”—i.e., that it would not count toward either of his
sentences. The trial court explained that regardless of whether
he accepted the plea, his time served would indeed count
toward his Essex County sentence, but would not count
toward his Camden County sentence. Rountree reiterated his
rejection of the plea, the trial proceeded, and a jury convicted
him of first-degree armed robbery (a Graves Act crime) and
of hindering justice.
The Camden County sentencing judge determined that,
given Rountree‟s prior Essex County Graves Act conviction,
Rountree was a person who had “been previously convicted”
of a Graves Act crime. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-6(c). The
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court then applied the Graves Act‟s repeat-offender provision
and imposed a 50-year sentence, with parole eligibility after
16 years and 8 months, to run consecutively with his 10-year
Essex County sentence.
B.
Rountree challenged his conviction and his sentence
on direct appeal, and the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, affirmed. State v. Hawkins, 719 A.2d 689
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). The Supreme Court of New
Jersey denied Rountree‟s petition for certiorari. State v.
Hawkins, 744 A.2d 1211 (N.J. 1999).
Rountree then sought post-conviction relief on several
grounds, including that his Camden County attorney‟s failure
to consolidate his Camden County and Essex County plea
bargaining into one, lump-sum negotiation violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See State v. Rountree, 906 A.2d
1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). The state court agreed
that the Camden County attorney‟s failure to file a motion to
consolidate fell below what is expected of “counsel” within
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the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, but held that the failure
to consolidate was not prejudicial to Rountree‟s case because
the record indicated that he would not have accepted any
offer likely to emerge from a consolidated negotiation. Id. at
1138. The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied review. State
v. Rountree, 926 A.2d 852 (N.J. 2007). This exhausted
Rountree‟s state court remedies.
Rountree then filed in the District Court an 18 U.S.C.
§ 2254 habeas corpus petition. See Rountree v. Balicki, No.
07-5763, 2008 WL 4950008 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008). His
petition challenged the state court‟s post-conviction ruling as
to his Camden County (but not his Essex County) sentence,
alleging that deficient performance by his Camden County
counsel undermined the reliability of his Camden County
sentence. On November 18, 2008, the District Court applied
the

Antiterrorism

and

Effective

Death

Penalty

Act

(“AEDPA”) and denied Rountree‟s petition on the merits. Id.
at *1.
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Less than 30 days later, on December 15, 2008,
Rountree filed in the District Court a pro se motion for
extension of time to file for a certificate of appealability. On
February 24, 2009, he filed a motion for a certificate of
appealability with this Court. One year later, on February 24,
2010, we certified the appealability of three issues: (1)
whether his untimely notice of appeal deprived this Court of
jurisdiction; (2) whether his trial counsel was ineffective, and,
if so; (3) whether his trial counsel‟s conduct was prejudicial
to his case.
Five months later, on July 29, 2010, Rountree filed a
motion to expand his certificate of appealability to include
certification of: (1) whether the state court acted contrary to,
or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law when
it held that the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), did not retroactively
invalidate Rountree‟s Camden County sentence; (2) any
relevant sentencing implications from his not having been
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indicted for possession of a firearm in Camden County; (3)
whether the Camden County trial judge made improper
responses to jury questions; and (4) whether “other crimes
evidence and unindicted juvenile acts” were improperly
admitted during his Camden County trial. We granted the
motion.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 because Rountree‟s habeas petition alleged that
he was incarcerated in violation of the United States
Constitution, see Rountree v. Balicki, No. 07-5763, 2008 WL
4950008, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008), and because Rountree
exhausted his state court avenues for relief, see State v.
Rountree, 926 A.2d 852 (N.J. 2007). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) because Rountree met the
requirements for a timely pro se notice of appeal, and because
he obtained a certificate of appealability. See id. § 2253(c)(1).
The government contends that Rountree‟s notice of
appeal was untimely, thus depriving us of jurisdiction over
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his appeal from the District Court. We disagree. This case
falls within Rule 4(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
because this is a civil case to which the United States is not a
party. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) provides that a notice of appeal “must
be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the
judgment or order appealed from is entered.” Our Local
Appellate Rules relax certain formalities for pro se habeas
petitioners, including Rountree:
The court will deem a document filed by a pro
se litigant after the decision of the district court
in a civil, criminal, or habeas corpus case to be
a notice of appeal despite informality in its form
or title, if it evidences an intention to appeal.
3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.4 (2010) (“Notice of Appeal in Pro Se
Cases”). “This rule is designed to emphasize that the
jurisdictional requirement of a notice of appeal is met in a pro
se case by the filing of an informal document.” L.A.R. 3.4
(Committee Comments).
In this case, the District Court entered its denial of
habeas corpus relief on November 18, 2008. Rountree, 2008
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WL 4950008, at *2. Twenty-seven days later, on December
15, 2008, Rountree filed a pro se motion for extension of time
to file for a certificate of appealability. See Rountree v.
Balicki, No. 07-5763, 2009 WL 223421, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan.
27, 2009) (“Petitioner‟s motion for an extension of time is
dated December 12, 2008 and was docketed by the Clerk on
December 15, 2008.”). By indicating he would file for a
certificate of appealability, his pro se motion “evidence[d] an
intention to appeal,” which means it constituted a notice of
appeal pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 3.4. Because
Rountree filed that motion within the 30-day timeline
proscribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A), his notice of appeal was
timely.

And,

because

he

obtained

a

certificate

of

appealability, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 2253(a).
III.
The state court denied Rountree‟s Strickland v.
Washington claim on the merits, which means our review of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is subject to AEDPA. See 28
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U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2254(d). Under AEDPA, our task is to
determine only whether the state court‟s adjudication of
Rountree‟s Strickland claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
§ 2254(d). Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, we read
§ 2254(d) to require three distinct legal inquiries. See, e.g.,
Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
The first is whether the state court decision was “contrary to .
. . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). The
second is whether the state court decision “involved an
unreasonable application of” such law. § 2254(d)(1). And the
third is whether the state court decision “was based on an
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented” to the state court. § 2254(d)(2).
The test for § 2254(d)(1)‟s “unreasonable application
of” clause is as follows: “[a]n „unreasonable application‟
occurs when a state court „identifies the correct governing
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court‟s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts‟ of petitioner‟s
case.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (quoting
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 519, 520 (2003)). For purposes of
§ 2254(d)(1), “[i]t is not enough that a federal habeas court, in
its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm
conviction that the state court was erroneous.” Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (internal quotations
omitted). “Under § 2254(d)(1)‟s „unreasonable application‟
clause . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 7576 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)).
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Rather, “[t]he state court‟s application of clearly established
law must be objectively unreasonable” before a federal court
may grant the writ. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75.
The test for § 2254(d)(1)‟s “contrary to” clause is
whether the state court decision “applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme
Court‟s] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is
materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme]
Court but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544
U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, and
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)). Of course,
a state court‟s resolution of a question that the Supreme Court
has not resolved can be neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, the Court‟s precedent. See Kane
v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005).
The

test

for

§ 2254(d)(2)‟s

“unreasonable

determination of facts” clause is whether the petitioner has
demonstrated

by

“clear

and

convincing

evidence,”

§ 2254(e)(1), that the state court‟s determination of the facts
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was unreasonable in light of the record. See Rice v. Collins,
546 U.S. 333, 338-339 (2006) (“State-court factual findings,
moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden
of rebutting the presumption by „clear and convincing
evidence.‟”) (quoting § 2254(e)(1)) (citing Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005))); see also Simmons v.
Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Under the § 2254
standard, a district court is bound to presume that the state
court‟s factual findings are correct, with the burden on the
petitioner to rebut those findings by clear and convincing
evidence.”). Importantly, the evidence against which a federal
court measures the reasonableness of the state court‟s factual
findings is the record evidence at the time of the state court‟s
adjudication. Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 2011 WL
1225705, at *11 (Apr. 4, 2011).
We will grant relief only if Rountree shows that the
New Jersey state court‟s decision satisfied one of the three
tests set forth above.
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IV.
Rountree petitioned the New Jersey courts for postconviction relief on the basis of an alleged violation of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), during the
proceedings that led to his Camden County sentence. A
Strickland violation occurs when (1) defense counsel‟s
conduct falls below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) there is a reasonable probability (which is more than a
mere possibility) that but for the counsel‟s failure, the
proceeding would have come out differently. Id. at 687. The
New Jersey court rejected that claim, determining that
although Rountree‟s counsel‟s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, that failing did not
cause prejudice to Rountree. See State v. Rountree, 906 A.2d
1124, 1138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
In this habeas petition, Rountree contends that the New
Jersey court‟s rejection of his Strickland claim was
unreasonable. We recognize that AEDPA “precludes federal
habeas relief so long as „fairminded jurists could disagree‟ on
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the correctness of the state court‟s decision.” Richter, 131 S.
Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
664 (2004)). Accordingly, we will not surmise whether the
state court reached the best or even the correct result in
Rountree‟s case; rather the question we must answer is
“whether the state court‟s application of the Strickland
standard was unreasonable”—a standard that is at once
objective and deferential. Id. at 785.
Applying AEDPA, we conclude that the New Jersey
court‟s decision in this case survives review under § 2254.
Although certain portions of the record can be argued to
support

Rountree‟s

petition,

it

is

precisely

because

“fairminded jurists could disagree” with each other that we
must affirm the state court‟s holding. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at
664. We will therefore affirm the District Court.
A.
We begin with the New Jersey state court‟s
interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington‟s
“ineffectiveness” prong. See 466 U.S. at 687-688. Under
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Strickland, Rountree‟s first burden in the state court was to
demonstrate that his trial counsel‟s conduct “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The test,
which is “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance,” is applied to “the facts
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel‟s
conduct.” Id. at 690.
To evaluate properly the decisions the state court made
when faced with Rountree‟s Strickland claim, we must first
examine the contentions Rountree made there. Rountree
contended in the state court that his Camden County trial
counsel failed to render professionally competent assistance,
because the counsel did not file a motion under Rule 3:25A-1
of the New Jersey Rules of Court to consolidate into one
negotiation the plea bargaining over all charges pending in
both Camden and Essex Counties. He pointed out that his
counsel and the Camden County judge had on-the-record
discussions about the possibility of such consolidation, and
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that the transcript of his (later-withdrawn) guilty plea from
Camden County gave every indication that the judge would
have agreed to consolidate, if a motion had been filed. Noting
that consolidation generally redounds to the benefit of
criminal defendants, Rountree contended that his counsel‟s
failure to file the motion—notwithstanding the strong
indication that it would have been granted—amounted to
conduct

that

“fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688.
The state court agreed with Rountree. Rountree, 906
A.2d at 1137. It applied the New Jersey Supreme Court‟s
decision in State v. Pillot, 560 A.2d 634, 643 (N.J. 1989)
(construing Rule 3:25A-1 to “enable a defendant to request
consolidation of charges pending in multiple counties for
purposes of offering pleas and for sentencing”), and
concluded that consolidation was legally permissible in
Rountree‟s

case.

Because

consolidation

was

legally

permissible, and given the record‟s strong indication that it
would have occurred had a motion been filed, the state court
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held that Rountree‟s counsel had a professional obligation to
file a Rule 3:25A-1 motion.
The District Court, which was bound to accept the
state court‟s conclusions of state law in applying New
Jersey‟s Rule 3:25A-1, affirmed the state court. See
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“We have
repeatedly held that a state court‟s interpretation of state law,
including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged
conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”)
(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991), and
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)). After
accepting that consolidation was possible in Rountree‟s case,
the District Court concluded that the state court did not apply
Strickland in an unreasonable fashion when it held that any
competent New Jersey attorney would have filed a Rule
3:25A-1 motion in these circumstances.
We will affirm the District Court for substantially the
same reasons: we too are bound to accept the state court‟s
announcement that the Pillot decision obliges New Jersey
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defense attorneys to move to consolidate plea negotiations
when the facts indicate the motion will be granted, see
Richey, 546 U.S. at 76, and we agree that the state court‟s
interpretation of the facts in this case (i.e., its conclusion that
a Rule 3:25A-1 motion to consolidate would have been
granted) was not objectively unreasonable. We also agree
that, in holding that Rountree‟s counsel‟s conduct fell short of
what an objectively reasonable New Jersey attorney would
do, the New Jersey court correctly applied federal law as
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States. We will
therefore affirm the state court‟s conclusion that Rountree
carried his first burden under Strickland v. Washington.
B.
We turn now to the “prejudice” prong of Rountree‟s
Strickland claim. Rountree‟s second Strickland burden in the
state court was to show that his counsel‟s unprofessional
conduct prejudiced his case. 466 U.S. at 688. But his burden
before us is greater: under AEDPA, the question is “„not
whether

a

federal

court

believes
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the

state

court‟s

determination‟ under the Strickland standard „was incorrect,
but

whether

that

determination

was

unreasonable—a

substantially higher threshold.‟” Knowles v. Mirzayance, --U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (quoting Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). Our task is to
determine only whether the state court adjudication of
Rountree‟s claim warrants relief under § 2254(d)(1) or
§ 2254(d)(2). To prevail under those subsections, he must
persuade us that the New Jersey court‟s holding suffered from
one of the following failings: (1) it “was contrary to” or
“involved an unreasonable application of” federal law then
clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court of
the United States; or (2) it “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts” in light of the record before the
state court. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (quoting § 2254(d) and
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the state court‟s determination of the prejudice
prong of Rountree‟s Strickland claim was not unreasonable
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within the meaning of § 2254(d), and therefore we will
affirm.
1.
Intelligent evaluation of the state court‟s application of
federal law to Rountree‟s case requires at least some
evaluation of the facts to which the state court applied that
law. We therefore pause to set forth the legal rules that
applied in, and the arguments Rountree made before, the New
Jersey state court.
Rountree‟s Strickland burden in the state court
required him to demonstrate that the unprofessional errors of
his counsel caused him prejudice. 466 U.S. at 688. This is
because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of
a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment.” Id. at 691 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449
U.S. 361, 364-365 (1981)). “It is not enough for the defendant
to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, to meet this
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standard, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at
694 (emphasis added).
To meet this standard in the New Jersey court,
Rountree contended that his Camden County counsel‟s failure
to file a Rule 3:25A-1 consolidation motion increased his
sentence. Cf. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-203
(2001). In his view, the failure to consolidate the Camden
County and Essex County charges into one proceeding caused
him to be convicted of Graves Act crimes on two separate
occasions, rather than all at once as might have happened
after a single, lump-sum plea. That is, he argued that because
he was first convicted of a Graves Act offense in Essex
County, he arrived at sentencing in Camden County as a
“previously convicted” Graves Act offender. Because the
Graves Act imposes heightened penalties for persons
previously convicted of Graves Act offenses, see N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:43-6(c), Rountree‟s position in the New Jersey
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court was that the sentencing enhancement applied to him
was caused by his counsel‟s ineffective failure to consolidate.
Essential to Rountree‟s position was the implied premise that,
if offered a single lump-sum plea at a consolidated
negotiation, he would have accepted it.
The state court rejected Rountree‟s arguments after
concluding that Rountree would not have accepted a
consolidated plea even had he been offered one. Rountree,
906 A.2d at 1138. The state court based this conclusion on the
following facts: Rountree went to trial in Camden County
after his Graves Act conviction for attempted murder in Essex
County, for which he received a 10-year sentence. Ten years
is at the low end of the possible punishment under New
Jersey law for the crimes he faced (i.e., conspiracy to commit
murder,

first-degree

attempted

murder,

second-degree

aggravated assault, third-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, and second-degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose). In April of 1996, shortly before
Rountree‟s Camden County trial, the Camden County
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prosecutor offered Rountree 20 years, during the first 7 of
which he would be ineligible for parole. The entire Camden
County sentence would run concurrently with his 10-year
Essex County sentence. (The prosecutor further stated that if
Rountree‟s Essex County conviction were overturned on
appeal, he would agree to reduce Rountree‟s Camden County
sentence to nine years, with three years of parole ineligibility.
This represented the bare minimum sentence that the Graves
Act would allow.) This April 1996 offer would have settled
all of Rountree‟s charges, in both counties, for conspiracy to
commit murder, first-degree attempted murder, first-degree
armed robbery, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a
firearm, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and
hindering justice, with a 20-year sentence—and substantially
less, if Rountree were paroled. In the state court‟s view, this
offer was “as good as he reasonably could have expected if
the cases had been consolidated for plea negotiation or
sentencing.” 906 A.2d at 1138. Nonetheless, and against the
advice of his counsel, Rountree rejected it.
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Because Rountree rejected an offer that was as good as
what he could have hoped to have received after
consolidation, the state court saw no reason to conclude that
the failure to consolidate caused him any harm. Id. (“There is
no reason to conclude that he would have accepted the same
offer if it had been made after an order of consolidation.”).
On this basis, the state court concluded that his counsel‟s
ineffective failure to move for consolidation had no “effect on
the outcome of the proceeding”—i.e., the sentence Rountree
received after the Camden County jury found him guilty. Id.
2.
We turn first to Rountree‟s claim under § 2254(d)(2).
When reviewing a state court decision for “an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2), we are “bound to
presume that the state court‟s factual findings are correct,
with the burden on the petitioner to rebut those findings by
clear and convincing evidence.” Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d
223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009); see also § 2254(e)(1) (“In a
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proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State
court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall
have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness
by clear and convincing evidence.”).
Applying those rules, we will defer to two critical facts
found by the state court, because we conclude that Rountree
has not rebutted them by “clear and convincing evidence.”
§ 2254(e)(1); Simmons, 590 F.3d at 231. The first is the state
court‟s finding of what might have been offered during a
consolidated plea negotiation. We will defer to the state
court‟s conclusion that the April 1996 plea offer Rountree
received in Camden County (for a 20-year sentence with 7
years of parole ineligibility, to run concurrently with his
Essex County sentence) was “as good as he reasonably could
have expected if the cases had been consolidated for plea
negotiations or sentencing.” Rountree, 906 A.2d at 1138. We
accept this conclusion because Rountree has not offered
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“clear and convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), that there was
a “reasonable probability,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, that
he could have settled his charges for conspiracy to commit
murder, first-degree attempted murder, first-degree armed
robbery, aggravated assault, two distinct firearm offenses, and
hindering justice, for less than the terms of the April 1996
offer. We will therefore accept the New Jersey court‟s
conclusion that the offer Rountree rejected in April 1996 was
as good as he could have expected to receive at a consolidated
plea negotiation.
The second finding of fact to which we will defer is
the state court‟s finding of how Rountree would have reacted
to a consolidated offer. We will defer to its conclusion that,
had consolidation occurred, Rountree would not have
accepted any offer likely to emerge from it. 906 A.2d at 1138.
The state court based this finding on its conclusion that any
offer from a consolidated plea would not have been better
than the one he rejected in April 1996. See id. (“There is no
reason to conclude that he would have accepted the same
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offer if it had been made after an order of consolidation.”). To
persuade us to reverse, Rountree must offer “clear and
convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), that there was a
“reasonable probability,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, that if
consolidation had occurred, he would have accepted an offer
extending from that agreement. To make this showing,
Rountree calls our attention to the transcript leading to his
rejection of the April 1996 offer:
[Rountree]: I would just like to add that I was
trying to respond to him that it‟s a thing—it‟s
not just that I don‟t want to take the deal and
such, but they tell me that the last six, the last—
since December of 1994 till now . . . all that
time is not counting [toward my sentence]. The
time I‟ve been in prison is basically dead time.
This has a lot to do with me—do you
understand what I‟m saying?
The Court: It‟s not dead time. It counts toward
the sentence you are serving [in Essex County],
sir. It just doesn‟t count on the sentence you
might get in this case if you‟re convicted. Now,
the other thing is that‟s the offer. It‟s been made
to you. It is [your attorney‟s] representation that
you have no interest in accepting the offer.
Correct?
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....
[Rountree]: . . . correct, your honor.
App. 35. Rountree contends that (1) “the only logical reading
of the transcript” is that, in saying “they tell me,” Rountree
was referring to his counsel, and that (2) but for his counsel‟s
advice he would indeed have accepted the April 1996 offer.
The state court rejected both of these interpretations. It
concluded that Rountree‟s contention that he turned down the
April 1996 offer because he believed that he was not going to
receive credit for the time he had been serving on his Essex
County sentence was a “bald assertion,” 906 A.2d at 1133,
not sufficient to satisfy the “reasonable probability” standard
Strickland imposes. See 466 U.S. at 694.
Under AEDPA, the question we must answer is
whether Rountree has presented clear and convincing
evidence that the state court‟s conclusion was wrong.
Simmons v. Beard, 581 F.3d 158 165 (3d. Cir. 2009). At
bottom, the question of how to read this transcript (i.e.,
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whether or not it indicates that Rountree would have accepted
the offer but for his counsel‟s advice) is a question of fact that
can be argued either way. That the transcript can be read in
more than one way does not—by itself—rise to the level of
“clear and convincing evidence,” § 2254(e)(1), that the state
court must be deemed unreasonable in choosing one reading
over another. § 2254(d)(2). In this case, Rountree has offered
only his assertion, backed by inferences, that when he said
“they tell me” he referred to his counsel. He has not explained
why we should ignore the Camden County judge‟s correction
of his misstatement (“It‟s not dead time”), or how his selfserving assertion—standing alone—trumps the New Jersey
court‟s factual finding to the contrary. Simply put, the record
in this case does not contain the “clear and convincing”
evidence, § 2254(e)(1), required to meet § 2254(d)(2)‟s high
standard.
In sum, we conclude that Rountree has not
demonstrated that the New Jersey court‟s conclusions were
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
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of the evidence, because he has not rebutted “by clear and
convincing

evidence,”

§ 2254(e)(1),

the

state

court‟s

conclusions that (1) the April 1996 offer he rejected was as
good as he would have received at a consolidated negotiation,
and (2) he would have rejected the same offer had it occurred
after an order of consolidation. In light of these facts, which
we accept, it was not unreasonable for the state court to
conclude that consolidation would not have made any
difference in Rountree‟s case. We will therefore affirm the
District Court‟s denial of relief under § 2254(d)(2).
3.
We turn next to Rountree‟s claim under § 2254(d)(1),
and examine whether the state court‟s decision was either
“contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable application of”
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States. In making that evaluation, our
“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the

37

merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 2011 WL 1225705,
at *8 (Apr. 4, 2011).
The state court‟s decision was not “contrary to” clearly
established federal law. § 2254(d)(1). The state court
correctly articulated the federal standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel as set forth by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Strickland. See Rountree, 906 A.2d at 11331134 (articulating the Strickland standard). And, it correctly
applied that standard when it inquired into whether Rountree
had satisfied “both prongs,” and then weighed Rountree‟s
arguments against the “reasonable probability” test that
Strickland imposes. Id. at 1138 (applying Strickland‟s
prejudice prong).
Nor did it “involve[] an unreasonable application of”
federal law. § 2254(d)(1). As we have already discussed,
Rountree has not “rebut[ted] the presumption of correctness”
of the New Jersey court‟s fact-finding “by clear and
convincing evidence.” § 2254(e)(1). Under AEDPA, we will
accept the state court‟s conclusion that Rountree would have
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rejected any likely consolidated plea offer. That means his
counsel‟s failure to move to consolidate his plea bargaining
did not affect the outcome of his Camden County plea
negotiations. These facts were, under clearly established
Supreme Court case law, a reasonable and sufficient basis
upon which to deny his claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691
(“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”).
Because the New Jersey court applied Strickland
reasonably, it follows necessarily that it did not reach “a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). We
will therefore affirm the District Court‟s denial of relief.
In sum, we conclude that Rountree‟s petition does not
warrant relief under AEDPA. In light of the facts before the
state court—particularly Rountree‟s rejection of a plea offer
that was as good as anything that might have come after a
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motion to consolidate—it was not unreasonable for the state
court to conclude that Rountree‟s attorney‟s failure to file a
Rule 3:25A-1 motion had no effect on the sentence he
received

for

his

Camden

County

crimes.

Although

“fairminded jurists could disagree” with the way the state
court weighed the evidence in this case, Alvarado, 541 U.S. at
664, it was not objectively unreasonable of the state court to
conclude that, had consolidation occurred, Rountree would
have rejected any offer it produced, gone to trial, been
convicted separately for the separate Graves Act crimes he
did commit, and been sentenced as the repeat-offender that—
at the end of the day—he actually was.
We will therefore affirm the District Court.
V.
On July, 29, 2010, Rountree filed a motion to expand
the certificate of appealability to include four additional
issues. We granted the motion, but upon review we conclude
that the issues raised in the expanded certificate of
appealability lack merit. First, Rountree complains that his
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sentence was enhanced based on a judge-made finding that
his Camden robbery involved a real gun, in violation of
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We have held
that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to convictions that,
like Rountree‟s, were made final before Apprendi was
announced. See United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 491
(3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.
Second, Rountree claims that because he was never
indicted for possession of a firearm, he cannot be sentenced to
an extended Graves Act sentence. This claim fails because it
was not exhausted in state court. Further, the Graves Act‟s
applicability is not limited to those who are indicted and
convicted for illegally possessing a firearm. It applies equally
to those who use weapons in the course of another crime. See
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43-6(c).
Third, Rountree contends that the Camden trial judge‟s
responses to jury questions were improper. However, as the
District Court held, the state appellate court reasonably
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concluded that the judge‟s answers did not have a prejudicial
effect on the jury.
Finally, Rountree claims that his Camden trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to move to exclude other crimes
evidence. The record demonstrates that trial counsel objected
to the evidence and moved for a mistrial, but the Judge denied
the motion and directed the jury to disregard the other crimes
evidence. We agree with the state appellate court that the
judge‟s limiting instruction forestalled any unjust result.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the state court on
each of the issues raised in Rountree‟s motion for an
expanded certificate of appealability.
*****
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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